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Abstract: While housing equity accounts for a large portion of many retiree’s savings portfolios, 
they are not using their equity to increase consumption in retirement as suggested by the Life-
Cycle Hypothesis.  Defined benefit plans provide a guaranteed source of income in retirement 
where the household bears no risk, whereas households with a defined contribution plan are subject 
to potential risk depending on their asset allocation.  This paper examines whether having a defined 
benefit plan mitigated some of the effects of the Great Recession.  Using a difference-in-difference 
analysis, I examine the impact of the Great Recession on homeownership between households with 
a defined benefit plan compared to those with a defined contribution plan.  I find that households 
with a defined contribution plan were 2.1-2.9 percent less likely to own a home after the Great 
Recession compared to households with a defined contribution plan.  It is possible that households 
with defined contribution plans were willing to forgo homeownership to offset some of the losses 
experienced from the Great Recession.  Future retirees face a potentially riskier housing market 
and are less likely to have a defined benefit plan.  As a result, future retirees may be more willing 
to use their housing equity to increase consumption in retirement than was observed in past 
generations. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Owning a house has historically been a viewed as a safe investment receiving an average 
rate of return around 5 percent per year (S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC).  While it does not 
receive a rate of return as high as the stock market (over 7% seen in the S&P 500 (Yahoo 
Finance)), there has been relatively low volatility in housing prices, which have tended to 
increase each year.  As a result, nearly 80 percent of retirees own a house according the US 
Census Bureau (2018) and housing equity accounts for nearly half the net worth of retired 
Americans (Moulton et al. 2016).  The Great Recession of 2007-2009 was one of the most severe 
economic downturns in American history and was unique among recent recessions due to 
simultaneous shocks in the labor, stock, and housing markets.  During the recession, the S&P 
500 averaged a 2.3 percent monthly decline (Yahoo Finance), unemployment rose from 5.0 
percent to 9.5 percent (US Bureau of Labor Statistics), and the Case-Shiller Index averaged a 9.1 
percent decline (S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC).  Many older Americans (age 55 and older) saw a 
decline in home value simultaneous with a reduction in their retirement portfolios or income for 
those still working. 
 The Life-Cycle Hypothesis (LCH) suggests that households plan their consumption and 
savings paths throughout their lifetime by saving throughout their working years and then living 
off those savings plus return in retirement (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954).  Because housing 
equity constitutes a large part of a many retiree’s savings portfolios, the LCH suggest that they 
should use their accumulated housing equity to increase consumption in retirement.  However, 
prior to the Great Recession this was not usually the case, as many households die while still 
owning large positive housing equity1 (Borsch-Supan, Hajivassiliou, and Kotlikoff 1992; Ai et 
                                                          
1 Section 2 provides background information on the housing-equity puzzle. 
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al. 1990; Feinstein and McFadden 1989; Fisher et al. 2007; Poterba, Venti, and Wise 2011; Venti 
and Wise 1989, 1990, 2001, 2004).  With house values declining during the Great Recession, it 
is possible home ownership is no longer seen as the safe investment it once was and some 
households may choose to store their wealth elsewhere.   
Over the last 30 years, American employers have shifted away from defined benefit plans 
in favor of defined contribution plans (Butrica et al. 2009; Hurd and Rohwedder 2010).  Defined 
benefit plans are managed by the employer, who bear all the risk, and provide a guaranteed 
source of income in retirement for the remainder of the employee’s life based on years of 
service2.  Defined contribution plans – such as an employee sponsored 401(k) or 403(b) – are 
managed by the employee, who bears all the risk, and receive contributions from the employer.  
Defined contribution plans often carry more risk than defined benefit plans as they are sensitive 
to the portfolio and asset allocations the employee makes (Poterba et al. 2006).  Thus, without 
the guaranteed income provided by a defined benefit plan, older (for the purpose of this paper, 
those age 55+ and in their late working years) and retired households (generally age 65+) were 
subject to greater losses in savings and wealth during the Great Recession.  In this paper, I 
explore the role of defined benefit plans in homeownership after the Great Recession.  
Specifically, I examine whether households that had a defined contribution plan were willing to 
extract housing equity by foregoing homeownership and opting to rent instead, to offset some of 
these losses.  Using the Health and Retirement Study, I analyze how homeownership rates have 
changed since the Great Recession based on age and pension status.  Because the Great 
                                                          
2 Defined benefit plans vary in terms from employer to employer as to how much income they get, when 
beneficiaries are eligible to start collecting, and whether the pension can be passed on to a spouse in the event of 
death. 
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Recession had a varying impact for different regions of the country, I also analyze 
homeownership rates for households in urban and rural areas. 
 I find that while all households saw losses in non-housing related wealth following the 
recession, households with a defined contribution plans saw a significant decrease in 
homeownership rates compared to those that had a defined benefit plan.  A difference-in-
difference analysis shows households with defined contribution plans were 2.1-2.9 percent less 
likely to own a home following the Great Recession compared to households with a defined 
benefit plan, which saw little or no change in homeownership.  I find this change to be largely 
concentrated in households where at least one person is working and residing in urban 
households, as homeownership rates of rural households appear to not be affected by the Great 
Recession. 
 Results of this study suggest that households with a defined contribution plan were less 
likely to own a home after the Great Recession compared to households with a defined benefit 
plan, who had a guaranteed income.  While other explanations cannot be entirely ruled out, it is 
possible these households chose to reconsider the role the house played in their savings portfolio 
as more older households with defined contribution plans were more likely to act as would be 
expected per the LCH.  This is important because households under age 65 are significantly less 
likely to have a defined benefit plan than older retirees.  The decline housing values during the 
Great Recession indicate that they may not behave as they did in past decades, and that housing 
equity may indeed carry some risk.  Future retirees will be increasingly likely to have large parts 
of their savings portfolios in risky assets without the guaranteed income from a defined benefit 
plan.  The results of this paper are important to help future generations of retirees understand the 
changing role of home equity in retirement planning so that they may act accordingly. These 
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results also help policymakers understand the changing dynamics of retirees’ savings decisions 
and will help shape policy for the 21st century. 
 My findings make several contributions to the literature on the use of housing equity as 
households age. First, it provides an in-depth analysis of home ownership and transition rates for 
older Americans in the post-Great Recession era.  This complements earlier studies done by 
Feinstein and McFadden (1989), Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2011), Venti and Wise (1989, 1990, 
2001, 2004), and others.  Second, this is one of the first papers to analyze the impact of pension 
plans on homeownership after the Great Recession.  It provides new insights into how a defined 
benefit plan may influence how older Americans use their housing equity in retirement – 
something not observed before the Great Recession. 
 The next section proceeds with a discussion on the use of housing equity by older 
Americans in Section 2; Section 3 provides a description of the data and weighting; Section 4 
discusses wealth, homeownership, and moving rates of older Americans before after the Great 
Recession; Section 5 lays out the empirical strategy used in this paper; Section 6 presents and 
discusses the results; Section 7 offers sensitivity analysis and robustness checks; and Section 8 
offers concluding remarks.  
2. The Use of Housing Equity by Older Americans 
 The LCH suggests that households should extract their housing equity in retirement to 
supplement their savings and social security to help increase consumption spending.  Households 
can achieve this in one of three ways: downsizing to a smaller home, moving from owning to 
renting, or taking out a reverse mortgage.  In fact, households over age 65 could increase their 
median income by as much as 40 percent if they sold their home and annuitized the money from 
the sale (Butrica and Mudrazija 2016).  However, historically only around 2-9 percent of 
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homeowners move in a given year (Feinstein and McFadden 1989; Venti and Wise 2001, 2004, 
1989).  Since so many homeowners stay in their home, a reverse mortgage is an option that 
allows them to extract housing equity without moving, however only around 2 percent of retirees 
possess a reverse mortgage (Nakajima and Telyukova 2017; National Retirement Risk Index 
2010).  Some research suggests households do not appear to be aware of reverse mortgages or 
what they entail (Davidoff, Gerhard, and Post 2017; Kutty 1998; Venti and Wise 1990, 2004).  
Since the LCH indicates that homeowners should want to use their housing equity, an effort has 
been made to understand why many do not.  Some possible reasons include bequests, 
precautionary savings, and non-economic reasons. 
Past research has suggested that households may choose to forgo using equity in the 
house in order to leave it as a bequest (Feinstein and McFadden 1989; Hurd 1992).  However, 
Hurd (1992) found no evidence to support a bequest motive because the consumption and 
savings paths are almost identical for homeowners who are parents and nonparents.  He suggests 
that if there was a bequest motive then there should be a higher savings path for parents than 
nonparents, which was not the case.  Venti and Wise (1989) also noted that the change in 
housing equity is the same for older homeowners regardless of parental status, suggesting that a 
bequest is not the main explanation for reluctance to use housing equity.  Fisher et al. (2007) 
noted that if bequests were the motive, older Americans might treat their home as another part of 
their total financial portfolio, however, Hoynes and McFadden (1997) show that as house value 
increases, household total savings do not.  Despite its intuitive appeal, there is no strong evidence 
to support a prospective bequest as a driving force behind not extracting housing equity in 
retirement. 
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 Another possible explanation is that older Americans treat their house as a form of 
precautionary savings in the event of unexpected medical costs (Poterba, Venti, and Wise 2011; 
Venti and Wise 2001; Nakajima and Telyukova 2017).  One of the biggest consumption 
expenditures of older Americans is long-term care.  Given the uncertainty of if or when long-
term care will become necessary, the house can serve as a form of precautionary savings to serve 
as a form of insurance to provide funds if needed (Fisher et al. 2007).  Murray (2018) explores 
this explanation and finds that precautionary savings indeed accounts for up to 13 percent of 
households holding on to their housing equity. 
 A final theory is that as people age, they are less likely to view the house as an asset.  
Socioemotional Selective Theory (SST) is a lifespan theory of motivation popular in psychology 
that proposes that people monitor time horizons and adjust motivations, goals, and preferences as 
they age.  Older people are more likely to perceive time as finite.  Thus, they may place more 
importance on finding emotional meaning and satisfaction from life while investing fewer 
resources into gathering information and expanding horizons (Carstensen 2006).  Fisher et al. 
(2007) noted that if this is the case, older Americans may hold on to their home because they are 
more driven by emotional attachment than financial gain.  However, a reverse mortgage would 
allow a household to remain in their home and extract equity and satisfy both the LCH and SST. 
 In this paper, I explore an alternative explanation that was not observed prior to the Great 
Recession.  Defined benefit plans are less common for recent retirees and those who are about to 
retire compared to older generations on whom many previous studies were conducted.  In 
addition, the coinciding losses in wealth and house value during the Great Recession provides a 
unique opportunity to examine how having the guaranteed income from a defined benefit plan 
may have mitigated these losses compared to other households.  The potential willingness of 
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some households with a defined contribution plan to part with their housing equity after the 
Great Recession shows how a defined benefit plan may have influenced the historical decision of 
so many older Americans to not use their housing equity to increase consumption in retirement.  
It is possible that due to having a guaranteed source of income from a defined benefit plan, 
households never considered the house when making retirement decisions.  Households with 
defined contribution plans in a potentially risker housing market may be more willing to do so.  
3. Data and Weighting 
  
A. Data 
This paper uses individual and household level data from eight waves of the restricted 
version of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) from 1998-2014 to study homeownership 
before and after the Great Recession.  The HRS is a longitudinal survey that includes about 
20,000 households over age 50, representative of the overall United States population in that age 
group.  The HRS defines an observational unit as an eligible household containing at least one 
person born within a given time period (which varies by phase)3. The HRS is administered by the 
University of Michigan Institute for Social Research in partnership with the RAND Center for 
the Study of Aging.  The original target population for the HRS when the study was initiated in 
1992 is adults born between 1931-1941 (designated ‘HRS Cohort’) and those born before 1924 
(AHEAD cohort).  Every six years the survey adds a new cohort starting in 1998 with those born 
between 1924-1930 (Children of the Depression) and 1942-1947 (War Babies Cohort).  In 2004 
those born between 1948-1953 (Early Baby Boomers Cohort) were added; and the last group 
added was in 2010 with the addition of those born between 1954-1959 (Mid-Baby Boomers 
Cohort).  
                                                          
3 For more information on the HRS and its sample selection, see https://hrs.isr.umich.edu/publications/biblio/9047 
(HRS Staff, 2008).  
8 
 
This study uses the HRS due to its specific focus on older Americans.  While much of the 
research on housing uses the American Housing Survey, the HRS includes more information on 
retirement plans, asset composition, and spending in addition to demographical and housing 
characteristics, making it more appealing for this study. 
This study restricts attention to two household types: those consisting of either one 
person aged 55 or older or a married couple where the male is aged 55 or older4.  Urban and rural 
households are determined by the United States Department of Agriculture Rural-Urban 
Continuum Codes5 included in the HRS.  Metropolitan areas are classified as urban and non-
metropolitan areas rural.  All monetary values in the HRS are reported in nominal dollars and 
have been converted into real 2009 dollars using the PCE chain-type price index taken from the 
Federal Reserve Economic Database6. 
I use several key variables in this paper.  The first is whether or not a household has a 
defined benefit plan.  I construct an indicator variable using two metrics from the HRS.  The 
HRS provides a variable for how much each person in the household is receiving from an 
employer pension annually.  This is then constructed into a household variable by combining 
pension income if the household contains two people.  If the household reports receiving pension 
income from the employer, then the indicator variable takes a value of one; if they reported 
receiving no pension income from the employer, this variable takes a value of zero.  This study 
also includes households in their late working years who may not be collecting this income yet.  
In these cases, the HRS has information on whether or not they have a defined benefit plan from 
                                                          
4 This study allows for divorced and widowed households and would fall under a household with one person. 
5 More information on the USDA Rural-Urban Continuum Codes are available at https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-
products/rural-urban-continuum-codes/. 
6 Downloaded from the Federal Reserve Economic Database (https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PCEPI) on 5/13/2017 
(US Bureau of Economic Analysis)  
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their current job.  If they are working and have a defined benefit plan, then the indicator variable 
takes a value of one; if they are working and do not have a defined benefit plan, then it takes a 
value of zero. 
I also construct an indicator variable for households that have a defined contribution plan 
while not having a defined benefit plan.  The HRS provides a variable for the value of 
households defined contribution plans.  I sum value for all the plans of the household.  Since 
some households may extract the total value of their defined contribution plan, this variable takes 
the value of one if the household at any time reported a positive value for their defined 
contribution plans conditional on not also having a defined benefit plan, and a zero otherwise.   
Non-housing wealth is defined as total household assets less household debt excluding 
the value of the primary residence, mortgages, and home loans.  Income is defined as total 
household income and includes earnings, pension income, social security, and others.  A detailed 
breakdown of the variables used in this analysis and how they were constructed can be found in 
Appendix A. 
B. Weighting 
Because the age distribution of the respondents of the research sample changes from 
wave to wave because to households exit and enter the survey, inverse probability weights are 
constructed for each age group and applied to all analyses in this paper7.  The weight is based on 
the first year in the sample and constructed as follows: 
1
# of  individuals age i in 1998
weight
# of  individuals age i in year x
−
 
=  
 
                                               (1)  
 
                                                          
7 A sensitivity check is conducted in section 7 to explore the results without the weights 
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4. Household Wealth and Homeownership Rates   
A. Household Wealth  
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Following the Great Recession, many households saw declines in their non-housing 
wealth.  Table 1 shows that households with a defined benefit plan experienced a 5.5 percent 
decline in non-housing wealth compared to a 31.4 percent decline for households with a defined 
contribution plan.  Households with a defined benefit plan aged 65 and older saw no decline in 
non-housing wealth after the Great Recession whereas households with a defined contribution 
plan did. Households age 65 and over are more than twice as likely to have a defined benefit plan 
as those aged 55-64 and that younger households are more likely to have a defined contribution 
plan.  This is consistent with studies by Buessing and Soto (2006), Copeland (2006), and 
Wiatrowski (2004) that show that employers offering defined benefit plans have been on the 
decline over the last 30 years. 
B. Homeownership Rates 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Table 2 shows homeownership rates for all households before and after the Great 
Recession and for households with both defined benefit and defined contribution plans.  Overall, 
there was a 4-percentage point decline in homeownership rates following the recession.  This is 
largely concentrated in households with defined contribution plans.  These households saw 
declines in homeownership at all age groups and an increase in the rate of renting compared to 
households with a defined benefit plan.  Households with a defined benefit plan saw modest or 
no declines in homeownership rates.  
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 Households with a defined benefit plan tend to be concentrated among those already 
retired at the time of the Great Recession and they did not suffer as much as those between the 
ages of 55-64 and nearing retirement.  However, those at all ages with defined contribution plans 
saw declines in non-housing wealth and a decrease in homeownership rates following the Great 
Recession.  The declines in homeownership rates could be driven by a desire to use their housing 
equity to offset losses in retirement savings or they could no longer afford the mortgage.  Since 
homeownership may no longer be considered as safe an asset as in prior decades, households 
may be storing more of their wealth in other assets.  
C. Transition Rates 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 Table 3 shows the transition rates8 for households that moved for all households and 
households with and without a defined benefit plan.  There was a 2.2-percentage point decrease 
in the percent of older households that moved following the Great Recession.  For homeowners, 
there was a 13.8-percentage point decrease in the percent who moved from owning to owning 
and a corresponding 14.9-percentage point increase in the percent who moved from owning to 
renting.  The change in moving for renters was relatively small compared to that for 
homeowners.  Homeowners in the 55-64 age group saw a 15.7-percentage point decrease in the 
rate of homeowners moving to owning, the largest of all the age groups.  Those aged 65-74 saw a 
9.7-percentage point decline in moving from owning to owning and households aged 75-84 saw 
the smallest decline at 6.7-percentage points.  A smaller number of households moved after the 
                                                          
8 The transition rates in Table 3 are of the same format seen in Feinstein and McFadden (1989) and Venti and Wise 
(1989).  Where is says own/rent in the column that represents the current residence.  This table is to be read across 
showing the number of owners/renters, the percent of owners/renters that moved and the percent that moved to 
owning and the percent that moved to renting 
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Great Recession but out of those who did, they were more likely to move to renting and forgo 
homeownership. 
 Table 3 also shows this breakdown for households with both defined benefit and defined 
contribution plans.  The percent of older households that move after the Great Recession is 
relatively similar for households with defined benefit and defined contribution plans.  The 
percent of households who moved from owning to owning declined 13.1-percentage points for 
households with a defined benefit plan, and is largely concentrated among households aged 55-
64 and corresponds to the only age group that saw a modest decline in homeownership in Table 
2.  The percent of households who moved from owning to owning declined 17.8-percentage 
points for households with defined contribution plans and this decline occurred at all ages, 
corresponding to a drop in homeownership rates at all ages for this group shown in Table 2. 
 In summary, pre-retirement age households are less likely to have defined benefit plans 
than older and retired households and more likely to have defined contribution plans.  
Households with defined contribution plans saw more significant changes in homeownership 
than households with defined benefit plans.  This will be further analyzed using regression 
analysis.  
5. Empirical Strategy 
A.  Difference-In-Difference  
I use a difference-in-difference estimation strategy to measure the effect of the Great 
Recession on homeownership for households with and without defined benefit plans using the 
following regression: 
0 1 2 3prob( 1| )      (2)it it t it t i ithomeownership X DC Post DC Post    = = + + + + + + +  it t'X  
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The dependent variable representing homeownership status for household i  at time t  and is an 
indicator variable that is equal to one if the household reports owning a house and a zero if they 
report renting or other9. 
itDC is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the household has a 
defined contribution plan and is equal to zero if they have a defined benefit plan.  
tPost  is an 
indicator variable that is equal to one in the years after the Great Recession (2010-2014).  The 
coefficient of interest is 
3 , which captures the effect of the Great Recession on homeownership.  
I expect this value to be negative if households without a defined benefit plan were less likely 
than those with one to own a house following the Great Recession. 
The demographic controls included in the vector
it
X  are as follows: inverse hyperbolic 
sine (IHS) of income, lagged IHS of non-housing wealth, an indicator for marital status, an 
indicator for being unemployed, years of education, number of children, age, and age squared.  
i  represents state fixed effects and t represents year fixed effects.  The IHS is used in place of 
logged values to incorporate zero and negative values10.  Table 4 shows the means and 
differences of observable characteristics for households with defined benefit and defined 
contribution plans separated by the treatment period. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 Since the Great Recession had varying impacts on different parts of the country, I split 
the sample into urban and rural households to test for heterogeneous effects across geographic 
areas.  For this purpose, equation (2) was re-estimated for urban and rural households 
independently.    
                                                          
9 The HRS has a third category for living in “other.”  This includes such scenarios as living in a recreational vehicle, 
living with parents rent free, and other types of residential situations besides home ownership and renting 
10 See Burbidge, Magee, and Robb (1988) and Pence (2006) for derivation and use of the IHS transformation. 
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B. Treatment and Control States 
Homeownership rates for households with a defined contribution plan appear to have 
been more affected by the Great Recession and serve as the treatment group.  Defined benefit 
plans are the complement to a defined contribution plan and serve as the control group.  In 
equation (2), 
3  represents the effect of the Great Recession on homeownership status for 
households without a defined benefit plan.  The interpretation of 
3  as the causal effect of the 
Great Recession on homeownership status requires two assumptions.  First, the decision to own a 
home should be exogenous to other policies or observable factors.  For this assumption to be 
true, in the absence of the Great Recession the difference in homeownership trends for 
households with and without a defined benefit plan should be similar before and after 2010.   
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
Table 5 shows a balance test to determine if there were changes in observable characteristics 
before and after the Great Recession.  For each demographic variable, I estimate a variation of 
equation (2) with each control as the dependent variable without the other control variables.  This 
test shows that some of the demographic variables, including non-housing wealth and children, 
have statistically significant changes after the Great Recession.  While such factors might 
influence the decision to own a home, when adding these controls into the estimation, the 
baseline results (shown in the next section) do not fluctuate significantly.  Since there is 
imbalance, I conduct an analysis outlined in Oster (2017) to include bounds on the treatment 
effect to show these results can serve as an upper bound.  While it is not impossible to rule out 
other causes, this eases the concern that the results might be driven by other factors. 
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Second, the interpretation of 
3  as causal requires the outcomes in the treated and control 
groups to follow parallel trends prior to the Great Recession.  I asses the validity of this 
assumption in two ways.  First, the homeownership rates for both groups are visually graphed in 
Figure 1.  Prior to 2010, homeownership rates between the two groups had the same general  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
trend.  Following 2010, households with a defined benefit plan continue the same trend while 
households without show a decline.  A trendline is included to show the trend had it not changed 
after the Great Recession.  Second, I test this assumption by interacting a linear time trend 
(
tTrend ) with the treatment variable, restricting the period to 1998-2008, and estimating the 
following regression equation while including the same controls as in equation (2): 
0 1 2prob( 1| )it it t it i ithomeownership X DC Trend DC   = = + + + + + +  it t'X           (3) 
If the treatment and control groups have similar trends prior to the Great Recession, then 2 in 
equation (3) should be small and statistically insignificant.  Table 6 presents the results of 
equation (3) for all households, urban households, and rural households.  2  is small and 
statistically insignificant for all three models providing evidence of parallel trends prior to the 
Great Recession. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
6. Results 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
A. All Households 
Table 7 shows the results from difference-in-difference regression depicted in equation 
(2).  Column 1 shows the regression outline in equation (2) without controls and, in Column 2, I 
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add demographic controls to ensure they do not impact the results.  Column 1 indicates that 
households with a defined contribution plan were 2.9 percent less likely to own a home after the 
Great Recession than households with a defined contribution plan, an effect that is statistically 
significant at the one percent level.  Column 2 shows that when including demographic controls, 
the effect decreases to 2.1 percent, but remains statistically significant at the five percent level.  
This eases the concern that the results might have been driven by changes in income, non-
housing wealth, or other factors.  A sensitivity analysis is conducted in Section 7 to show that 
these results are robust to observation changes due to adding controls.  These estimates show that 
the Great Recession influenced housing decisions among households with a defined contribution 
plan, but no corresponding effect was seen on households with a defined benefit plan.  It appears 
that having a defined benefit plan as a guaranteed source of income provided security against 
losses they may have suffered that households with a defined contribution plan did not have. 
B. Urban vs Rural Households 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 show the results from difference-in-difference regressions 
when the sample is restricted to just urban households.  Column 3 shows the results without 
demographic controls and Column 4 shows the results with demographic controls.  Column 3 
shows that urban households with a defined contribution plan were 3.3 percent less likely to own 
a house than their urban counterparts with a defined benefit plan.  This effect is statistically 
significant at the one percent level.  This percentage falls to 2.6 percent when adding controls, as 
seen in Column 4, and remains significant at the one percent level.  The small changes seen 
when adding controls again ease the concern about other factors driving the results. 
 Columns 5 and 6 show the results from the difference-in-difference regressions when the 
sample is restricted to just rural households.  Column 5 does not include demographic controls 
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and Column 6 does.  None of the results are statistically significant, suggesting that the Great 
Recession did not impact homeownership for rural households the way it did urban households.  
This is a trend seen in other studies showing that urban households were affected more severely 
by the Great Recession than their rural counterparts (Thiede and Monnat 2016; Mattingly, Smith, 
and Bean 2011).  Bailey, Jenson, and Ransom (2014) note that many rural areas were already 
suffering with a troubled labor market due to lower levels of education and aging populations, 
perhaps because the decline in the manufacturing sector had already produced economic 
hardships in these areas (Slack 2014).  The fact that rural households did not experience the same 
economic decline as urban households likely explains why the lack of significant change in 
homeownership differential between households with and without defined benefit plans.     
7. Sensitivity and Robustness Checks 
 [INSERT TABLE 8a HERE] 
 To ensure that the changing sample from adding controls is not what is influencing the 
coefficient change, I re-estimate the results from Table 6 Column 1 but restrict it to the sample 
found in Column 2.  The results of this are shown in Panel A of Table 8a.  The treatment effect 
decrease by 0.3 percentage points showing that households with a defined contribution plan are 
3.2 percent less likely to own a house after the Great Recession compared to households with a 
defined benefit plan.  This small change provides evidence the changing sample is not 
influencing the results. 
 The HRS sample used in this study also incorporates the recession that started in March 
2001 and ended in November 2001.  There should be no impact on homeownership from this 
recession since the impact of the housing market was unique to the Great Recession.  To test this, 
I re-estimate equation (2) with using the 2001 recession as the treatment period instead of 2008.  
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The results of this regression are shown in Panel B of Table 8a and show that there was no 
impact of homeownership for households without a defined benefit plan compared to those that 
did have one.  This provides further evidence that it was indeed the Great Recession that is 
causing these results not just economic downturns in general. 
 Panel C of Table 9a shows the results of the difference-in-difference models without 
using age weights mentioned in Section 3.  The results without the weights are slightly more 
negative but show the same trend as the results using the age weights.  The age weights place 
slightly more emphasis on older age groups to account for survival bias.  The results being more 
negative without weights makes sense because the Great Recession had a greater impact on 
homeownership for those 55-64 compared to those 65 and older, and removing the age weights 
gives the younger age group a larger share of the sample. 
 Due to the imbalance of observables, I cannot rule out the impact of unobservables on the 
results, however it is possible to provide bounds on the treatment effect to show how the 
unobservable might impact the results. Oster (2017) provides an extension to Altonji, Elder, and 
Taber (2005), which outlines the procedure11.  Oster (2017) shows that assuming the role of 
observables is proportional to the role of observables in determine treatment effect, it is possible 
to determine a bound on the treatment effect.  If the bound does not include zero, this provides 
information on the direction unobservable might influence the results.  The bounds from this 
procedure, using the Stata code accompanying Oster (2017), are shown in Panel D of Table 8a.  
The bound on the treatment effect does not include zero for any of the regressions, suggesting 
that the estimates shown in Table 6 may be an upper bound.    
                                                          
11 Several recent studies have incorporated this procedure including Baranov et al. (2015), Gunes and Tsaneva 
(2016), and Ozier (2018),  
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[INSERT TABLE 8b HERE] 
 In Table 8b I split the sample in two different ways to measure the impact of the Great 
Recession on homeownership.  In Panel A I restrict the sample so that at least one person in the 
household is working.  This shows that working households with a defined contribution plan 
were 2.1 percent less likely to own a house after the Great Recession compared to households 
with a defined benefit plan.  Urban households with defined contribution plans were  2.3 percent 
less likely to own a home following the Great Recession though only significant at the ten 
percent level, and much like the full sample, there is no significant effect for rural households.  
In Panel B I restrict the sample to households that are fully retired.  The effect of having a 
defined contribution plan is of similar magnitude as the full sample but is not statistically 
significant. This is not unexpected as a large percentage of households that were already retired 
at the time of the Great Recession had defined benefit plans (see Table 1) and those that did not, 
had most likely started to adjust their portfolio away from stocks and risky assets once they hit 
retirement (Fagereng, Gottlieb, and Guiso 2017).  As such, they most likely did not see as severe 
losses as pre-retirement households who still possessed risky assets.  Hurd and Rohwedder 
(2010) note that retirees were likely to suffer less than those who were in their late working 
years.  It is important to note that the number of Americans working past age 65 has been 
increasing since the 1990s (Hurd and Rohwedder 2010; Kaul and Goodman 2017; Toosi 2015).  
Therefore, this effect is not necessarily isolated to just households under age 65, but to 
households that have not fully decided to retire.  In summary, having a defined contribution plan 
lead to a significant decrease in homeownership after the Great Recession compared to 
households with a defined benefit plan, however this effect appears to be largely concentrated 
among urban households where at least one person is working.   
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These sensitivity and robustness checks show that the results are robust and most likely 
not driven by unobservable factors and that they were indeed caused by the Great Recession. 
8. Conclusions and Discussion  
 The Great Recession was one of the most severe economic downturns in contemporary 
American history.  Households experienced declines in income, savings, and property values.  
For Americans that were retired or near retirement, these losses could be difficult if not 
impossible to recover.  Having a defined benefit plan may have possibly mitigated some of the 
losses that may have been suffered in other assets.  Households with defined contribution plans 
saw losses in their retirement portfolio and wealth without the security that a defined benefit plan 
provides.  As a result, households with defined contribution plans saw larger declines in 
homeownership compared to households with a defined benefit plan.  Additionally, households 
with defined contribution plans saw a larger decline in the amount of homeowners who moved 
from owning to owning and a larger increase in the percent of homeowners who moved from 
owning to renting.  It is possible that in the future, homeownership may no longer be regarded as 
the safe investment it once was; storing wealth in excess housing equity carries new risk.  In 
addition, an increasing number of households no longer have defined benefit plans and rely more 
heavily on defined contribution plans.  With much savings tied up in potentially more risky 
assets, households with a defined contribution plan appear less likely to store wealth in housing 
equity in retirement, needing it to maintain spending levels.  This is a new phenomenon; 
historically, many households have died with large sums of housing equity they could have used. 
 This paper provides some of the first evidence of the impact of the Great Recession upon 
homeownership in the context of housing equity use by older Americans.  I find that households 
with a defined contribution plan were 2.1-2.9 percent less likely to own a house than those with a 
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defined benefit plan after the Great Recession.  By contrast, homeownership rates after the 
recession were relatively unchanged for the latter group.  Comparing this effect between urban 
and rural areas, I find that this effect appears largely concentrated in urban areas where 
households with a defined contribution plan were 2.6-3.3 percent less likely than those with a 
defined benefit plan to own a home after the Great Recession.  In households where at least one 
person is working, households with a defined contribution plan were 2.1 percent less likely to 
own a home after the recession compared to households with a defined benefit plan.  No such 
differential effect was found in rural areas or households that are fully retired, which is consistent 
with other studies that show the impact of the Great Recession was more heavily concentrated in 
urban areas and that older retirees are more likely to have defined benefit plans and less likely to 
have risky assets which both mitigate the impact of the Great Recession. 
 In the post-Great Recession era, an increasing number of retirees are going to be living 
off their accumulated savings in risky assets with defined benefit plans disappearing in favor of 
defined contribution plans.  Since house prices declined during the Great Recession, there is no 
guarantee that housing prices will not decline again.  Storing wealth in housing equity is now 
potentially associated with some risk.  It is likely that future retirees without defined benefit 
plans, being unable to count on their home value always increasing, may reduce housing equity 
and even forgo homeownership altogether, storing that wealth in other assets.  Historically, 
having a defined benefit plan gave households enough guaranteed income that they possibly 
chose not to use the equity in their house even though they were able to do so.  Future 
households may not have this luxury.  As America’s population ages and people live longer in 
retirement, understanding how Americans finance their retirement – and how this will change in 
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the future – is important as federal, state, and local policymakers look to shape policy for the 21st 
century.    
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Note: Median income and non-housing wealth are reported in real 2009 dollars  
10. Tables and Figures 
 
 
                
    All Households With DB Plan With DC Plan 
Age   1998-2008 2010-2014 1998-2008 2010-2014 1998-2008 2010-2014 
ALL 
Median Income 30,657 32,066 38,452 41,888 62,666 63,465 
Median Non-Housing Wealth 49,415 28,270 92,575 87,454 91,940 63,041 
% with DB Plan 41.81 32.35     
% with DC Plan 12.26 21.24     
55-64 
Median Income 51,292 46,725 55,960 62,236 76,387 80,623 
Median Non-Housing Wealth 53,168 16,019 107,587 70,203 87,622 54,042 
% with DB Plan 20.03 10.68     
% with DC Plan 34.68 37.29     
65-74 
Median Income 33,880 36,985 42,761 49,289 51,198 45,442 
Median Non-Housing Wealth 57,740 46,236 99,935 104,443 96,737 88,578 
% with DB Plan 44.86 40.28     
% with DC Plan 11.82 22.67     
75-84 
Median Income 25,626 26,116 34,473 37,655 39,773 28,254 
Median Non-Housing Wealth 49,379 40,333 87,211 88,955 84,135 52,138 
% with DB Plan 53.09 46.98         
% with DC Plan 1.83 8.74     
 
 
 
 
Table 1.  Household Wealth Before and After the Great Recession 
27 
 
Note: Columns may not sum to 100% because the HRS includes a third option for homeownership called “other.”  
 
 
 
 
 
                
    All Households With DB Plan With DC Plan 
Age   1998-2008 2010-2014 1998-2008 2010-2014 1998-2008 2010-2014 
ALL 
Own 76.70 72.86 83.86 82.85 88.40 84.55 
Rent  19.98 26.09 13.57 16.21 10.58 16.21 
 55-64 
Own 81.06 69.28 91.40 87.10 89.11 84.51 
Rent  16.82 29.85 7.31 12.17 9.11 15.00 
65-74 
Own 80.05 79.66 88.4 89.06 87.60 85.63 
Rent  17.88 19.55 10.30 10.28 11.39 14.03 
75-84 
Own 75.43 76.30 81.04 83.08 90.96 81.96 
Rent  19.81 22.65 15.06 16.29 8.67 17.54 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Homeownership rates Before and After the Great Recession 
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Note: Columns may not sum to 100% because the HRS includes a third option for homeownership called “other.”  This table shows on the columns whether or not 
the household is an owner or a renter and if they move, the percent that move to owning or renting for the rows.  For example: For all households between 1998-
2008, 8.13% of households that are current owners decided to move and 71.04% of them decided to move to owning and 25.21% decided to move to renting 
 
                            
      1998-2008 
    All Households With DB Plan With DC Plan 
AGE   N % Move Own Rent N % Move Own Rent N % Move Own Rent 
ALL 
Own 41,246 8.13 71.04 25.21 17,539 8.04 70.09 26.28 8,024 8.87 82.90 14.79 
Rent 9,628 20.48 13.55 80.69 2,524 21.86 14.64 79.28 938 30.10 29.83 67.63 
55-64 
Own 14,212 9.26 84.59 13.79 3,034 9.66 91.51 7.78 5,899 9.79 86.55 11.60 
Rent 2,789 25.95 22.97 71.25 227 30.39 30.47 65.80 630 31.88 36.85 59.12 
65-74 
Own 15,403 7.56 76.18 20.87 7,829 7.40 77.07 20.47 1,938 7.93 77.94 18.92 
Rent 3,239 20.54 13.16 82.05 897 22.70 17.25 76.98 246 28.81 22.91 76.13 
75-84 
Own 9,313 7.68 59.51 34.54 5,417 8.04 59.03 34.44 211 6.39 73.41 26.59 
Rent 2,261 17.47 10.1 84.26 938 19.09 13.70 6.53 23 32.90 11.32 88.68 
      2010-2014 
ALL 
Own 13,462 5.89 57.27 40.08 4,388 5.68 57.02 40.77 3,925 5.49 65.15 33.42 
Rent 4,317 19.79 12.59 84.11 757 19.11 17.98 77.62 636 26.95 16.83 82.02 
55-64 
Own 5,912 6.37 68.86 32.9 796 5.60 58.99 41.01 2,717 5.79 66.17 32.17 
Rent 2,298 24.66 12.61 84.9 94 31.43 16.30 83.70 436 27.43 16.24 81.86 
65-74 
Own 3,776 4.85 66.44 29.84 1,693 4.64 76.10 20.87 932 5.02 61.10 37.68 
Rent 845 19.74 13.25 83.9 187 19.98 21.15 78.85 142 27.19 20.24 79.76 
75-84 
Own 2,934 5.38 52.86 43.49 2,257 4.99 54.95 44.09 331 5.87 69.79 30.21 
Rent 837 13.66 12.05 85.91 423 17.43 22.20 77.80 60 25.33 6.89 93.11 
 
 
Table 3.  Transition Rates for Households that Moved 
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Note: The first two columns for each group provides the means and standard deviations for the treatment and control groups in the pre-period (1998-2008) and 
the post period (2010-2014).  The last column for each group provides the results from a t-test to see if there are significant differences between the treatment 
and control in the pre-period.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10  
                       
  Households with DB Pension   Households with DC Pension     
  Pre Post   Diff   Pre Post   Diff   Diff in Diff 
sinh-1(Income) 11.29 11.38   -0.08***   11.68 11.59   0.09***   0.17 
  (0.75) (0.83)       (1.14) (1.47)         
sinh-1(Non-Housing Wealth) 10.87 10.50   0.37***   11.02 9.89   1.13***   0.76 
  (4.84) (5.88)       (5.10) (6.52)         
Years of Education 12.55 13.27   -0.72***   13.24 13.65   -0.42***   0.30 
  (2.89) (2.79)       (2.89) (2.72)         
Number of Children 3.02 2.98   0.04   3.16 2.82   0.33***   0.29 
  (2.02) (2.00)       (1.96) (1.80)         
Married 0.61 0.57   0.03***   0.74 0.72   0.02***   -0.01 
  (0.48) (0.52)       (0.44) (0.45)         
Unemployed 0.01 0.02  -0.01***  0.03 0.05  -0.03***  -0.02 
 (0.09) (0.13)    (0.16) (0.23)     
Age 73.92 75.67   -1.75***   63.95 64.06   -0.11   1.64 
  (8.38) (9.89)       (5.71) (7.51)         
                        
Observations  27,089 9,966       15,025 9,728         
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.  Summary Statistics by Treatment Group and Time Period 
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Note: Standard errors are clustered at the household level.  Controls include an indicator for 
marital status, and indicator for being unemployed, years of education, age, age squared, IHS 
of income, lagged IHS of non-housing wealth, and state fixed effects.  These regressions 
were only run in the pre-period which is from 1998-2008.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
 
 
 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the household level.  Each cell represents a separate 
regression.  Columns 1 includes the full sample.  Column 2 restricts the sample to urban 
households.  Column 3 restricts the sample to rural households.  All specifications include 
state fixed effects and year fixed effects.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
 
 
 
        
Dependent Variable All Households Urban Rural 
        
sinh-1 (Income) -0.176*** -0.186*** -0.175*** 
  (0.027) (0.031) (0.050) 
sinh-1 (Non-Housing Wealth) -0.778*** -0.794*** -0.524* 
  (0.140) (0.159) (0.277) 
Years of Education -0.260*** -0.330*** -0.071 
  (0.070) (0.080) (0.050) 
Number of Children 0.284*** -0.305*** -0.126 
  (0.050) (0.056) (0.112) 
Married 0.011 0.018 -0.013 
  (0.004) (0.014) (0.026) 
Unemployed -0.019*** 0.021*** 0.009 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) 
Age -1.324*** -1.570*** 0.114 
  (0.210) (0.234) (0.456) 
 
 
 
 
 
          
  All Households Urban Rural 
  (1)  (2) (3) 
DC Plan X Time Trend 0.003  0.004 -0.005 
  (0.003)  (0.003) (0.006) 
        
Observations 31,111  25,597 5,514 
R2 0.148  0.154 0.145 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.  Test for Significant Pre-Trends 
Table 5.  Balance Test 
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Note: Standard errors are clustered at the household level.  Columns 1 and 2 include the full sample.  Columns 2 and 4 restrict the sample to urban 
households.  Columns 5 and 6 restrict the sample to rural households.  Controls include an indicator for marital status, and indicator for being 
unemployed, years of education, age, age squared, IHS of income, and lagged IHS of non-housing wealth.  All specifications include state fixed 
effects and year fixed effects. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
 
 
 
 
 
                        
  All Households   Urban   Rural 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
DC Plan x Post-2008 -0.029***   -0.021**   -0.033***   -0.026***   -0.004   0.009 
  (0.010)   (0.009)   (0.011)   (0.010)   (0.021)   (0.020) 
                        
Observations 50,372   46,218   41,714   38,177   8,658   8,041 
R2 0.021   0.164   0.024   0.152   0.033   0.149 
Covariates NO   YES   NO   YES   NO   YES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.  Estimation Results 
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Note: Standard errors are clustered at the household level.  Panels A-C represent separate regressions.  Panel A shows the same 
regression in Table 7 Column 1 but restricted to the sample of Table 7 Column 2.  Panel D shows the bounds on the treatment 
effect suggested by Oster (2017) using the Stata code provided with the article. Columns 1 includes the full sample.  Column 2 
restricts the sample to urban households.  Column 3 restricts the sample to rural households.  Controls include an indicator for 
marital status, and indicator for being unemployed, years of education, age, age squared, IHS of income, and lagged IHS of non-
housing wealth.  All specifications include state fixed effects and year fixed effects.   
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
 
 
        
  All Households Urban Rural 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Equal Observations with Controls       
DC Plan x Post-2008 -0.032*** -0.037*** -0.002 
  (0.010) (0.011) (0.022) 
     
Observations 46,218 38,177 8,041 
R2 0.021 0.024 0.033 
Covariates NO NO NO 
Panel B: 2001 Recession as Treatment Period       
DC Plan x Post-2002 0.005 0.008 -0.004 
  (0.010) (0.011) (0.017) 
     
Observations 46,218 38,177 8,041 
R2 0.164 0.170 0.159 
Covariates YES YES YES 
Panel C: No Age Weights       
DC Plan x Post-2008 -0.024*** -0.027*** -0.002 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.018) 
     
Observations 46,563 38,478 8,085 
R2 0.157 0.161 0.158 
Covariates YES YES YES 
Panel D: Coefficient Bounds       
Without Controls -0.029*** -0.033*** -0.004 
With Controls -0.021** -0.026*** 0.009 
    
Treatment Effect Bounds [-0.051, -0.021] [-0.067, -0.026] [0.009, 0.027] 
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Note: Standard errors are clustered at the household level.  Each panel represents a separate regression.  
Columns 1 includes the full sample.  Column 2 restricts the sample to urban households.  Column 3 restricts the 
sample to rural households.  Controls include an indicator for marital status, years of education, age, age 
squared, IHS of income, and lagged IHS of non-housing wealth.  All specifications include state fixed effects 
and year fixed effects.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
 
 
            
  
All 
Households   Urban   Rural 
  (1)   (2)   (3) 
Panel A: One Person in Household Working           
DC Plan x Post-2008 -0.021**  -0.023*  -0.002 
  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.023) 
       
Observations 20,336  16,703  3,633 
R2 0.123  0.130  0.117 
Covariates YES   YES   YES 
Panel B: Household Completely Retired           
DC Plan x Post-2008 -0.025  -0.029  -0.002 
  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.034) 
       
Observations 22,110  18,321  3,789 
R2 0.190  0.195  0.198 
Covariates YES   YES   YES 
 
 
 
Table 8b.  Sensitivity Checks 
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Note: The line in the figure is a two-period moving average trendline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Pre- and Post-Trends for Treatment and Control States 
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Appendix A: Description of Variables 
Variables from the HRS are taken from two sources.  The first is the Enhanced FAT files 
compiled by the RAND Center for the Study of Aging, which compiles the raw data from the 
survey into one file for each wave making it easier to merge with other waves.  The second is 
from the RAND HRS data file.  Developed at RAND with funding from the National Institute on 
Aging and the Social Security Administration, it is a cleaned file containing HRS data from all 
waves of the survey (RAND HRS Data 2016).  RAND takes the raw responses from the HRS –in 
some cases, questions vary across waves – and combine them into a variable that is consistent 
across waves. 
Variable Description 
Household Residence Household residence type comes from the enhanced FAT files where it 
is self-reported whether a person owns, rents, lives in other, or 
unknown.  The “other” category means anything outside of owning or 
renting, and the respondent is asked to specify.  These specifications 
include but are not limited to: an assisted living facility, retirement 
facility, nursing home, motel, living rent-free with friends or family, and 
recreational vehicle.  This variable is split into a dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 if the respondent reports owning and a 0 if the 
respondent reports renting or other. If it is unknown, the variable is 
coded as missing. 
Household Income Household income comes from the RAND HRS file and is a sum of all 
the self-reported income to the household, which includes: individual 
earnings, capital income, pension income, annuity income, social 
security, other government transfers, and other household income. 
Non-Housing Wealth Non-Housing Wealth comes from the RAND HRS file and is the sum of 
the self-reported values of real estate excluding the primary residence, 
vehicles, businesses, IRA accounts, stock value, checking accounts, 
checkable deposits, bonds, and other savings minus household debt.  
Defined Benefit Plan The Defined Benefit Plan indicator variable is created using two 
variables from the RAND HRS File.  The first is pension income and 
the second is whether or not a pension is offered at the current job.  
Pension income is reported separately for the respondent and the spouse, 
these are combined to determining a total household value of pension 
income.  If either the respondent or the spouse report having a defined 
benefit plan at their current job or the household reports receiving. 
36 
 
income from a defined benefit plan, the household is recorded as having 
a defined benefit plan.  
Defined Contribution Plan The Defined Contribution Plan indicator variable is creating using the 
self-reported balance of their defined contribution accounts.  There are 
four variables that households can report.  For each individual I sum 
these four variables.  I then sum across the household to get the total 
value of defined contribution plans for the household.  If a household 
ever reported having a positive value in their defined contribution plan, 
this variable takes a value of one.  This variable takes a value of zero if 
they do not or if they also report having a defined benefit plan. 
Years of Education Years of Education comes from the RAND HRS file. 
Number of Children Number of Children comes from the RAND HRS file. 
Age Age comes from the RAND HRS file.  The household variable for age 
is determined by the age of the male in married households and the age 
of the individual in single households. 
Marital Status Marital Status comes from the RAND HRS file.  This is a dummy 
variable taking a value of 1 if they report they are married and a value of 
0 for any other marital status. 
 
